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Chapter 1
BACK PAIN NATION
S ince nearly all of us get back pain, you may be one of the sufferers.If you’re not, you probably will be. Two-thirds of adults report 
back pain at some time in their lives. Think of it as a frustrating part of 
a normal, healthy life.
Yet back pain is distracting, debilitating, or disabling for some peo­
ple. It’s among the leading causes of work disability, and it restricts 
many people’s activities. Compared with cancer, diabetes, or heart dis­
ease, back pain may seem trivial to some, but it’s costing our society 
nearly as much as these life-threatening conditions.
If you have back pain, you’re confronted with a growing menu of 
treatments that are rapidly increasing in use. When our research team at 
the University of Washington scrutinized the growth in treatments for 
back pain, the numbers were startling. Over roughly a decade, from 1994 
to 2005, there was a 300 percent increase in MRI scans of the low back 
for Medicare patients. There was over a 100 percent increase in the use of 
narcotic painkillers for back pain and over a 200 percent increase in spinal 
fusion surgery. Expenditures for epidural steroid injections in the Medi­
care population—thanks to increasing use and rising prices—increased 
over 600 percent. We’ll explain and examine these treatments later.
C H A P T E R  1
These numbers mean that someone was making plenty of money 
from back pain. But as we’ll see, there’s no sign that, on average, pa­
tients were getting better results over this time. These changes reflected 
a booming back business.
How much do we spend on back pain? Coming up with realis­
tic cost estimates is a challenge. One approach is to ask how much 
more people who have back pain spend for medical care than sim­
ilar people who don’t. Our research group’s best estimate, based 
on national surveys: $86 billion in 2005. That was 9 percent of a ll 
health care costs, comparable to the costs of cancer or diabetes. And 
that figure didn’t even consider the costs of work loss or disability 
compensation.
Our team also found that costs for back pain were increasing faster 
than costs for medical care overall. And, of course, overall medical 
costs have increased faster than general inflation for many years.
Market watchers estimate that spinal implants alone—the plates, 
screws, and gadgets often used in spinal fusion surgery—cost $3.8 billion 
in 2009. That’s not counting the hospital charges or doctors’ bills. The 
national hospital bill for those operations—which includes the gadgets— 
was around $38 billion, although hospitals collect less. Drug market 
analysts estimated the market for narcotic painkillers at $8.4 billion in 
2011, and more than half the people who regularly take painkillers have 
back pain.
The cost of treating back pain appears to be higher in the United 
States than in most other developed countries. Our rate of back surgery, 
for example, is about twice the rate in Australia, New Zealand, most of 
Europe, and Canada. It’s five times higher than in the United Kingdom. 
And Americans seem to have a unique conviction that high-tech treat­
ments can solve all their medical problems.
Many people, perhaps most, assume that more medical care can 
only be better. Doctors are paid for doing more, not necessarily for 
doing better, so they’re happy to deliver more care. That means more 
testing, more doctor visits, more surgery, and more drugs.
2
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But are more of these things really better? This book considers what 
we know about treatments for back pain and asks a number of critical 
questions.
Are some of the most popular treatments really effective? Do they 
“cure” or even improve the problems they claim to address? If some 
back pain treatments are ineffective or even harmful, why do patients 
clamor for them and doctors provide them?
Who benefits from the vast back pain industry that’s developed over 
the past thirty years? Is it patients? Or the doctors, hospitals, and man­
ufacturers that produce the technology of back pain therapy?
What does all this say about our medical system? Or our efforts to 
enhance quality, improve safety, and reduce health care costs?
How can patients maneuver to help themselves rather than help 
the medical industry? W ill efforts to measure patient satisfaction 
help deliver safer and more effective treatments or encourage the 
opposite?
In answering these questions, this book does more than describe 
and analyze the back business. It also explores the complex ways that 
doctors interact with patients, drug companies, and medical device 
makers. The results can inadvertently lead to treatments that are inef­
fective or even harmful.
These issues aren’t unique to patients and doctors dealing with back 
pain. Back pain is a microcosm of broader problems in our health care 
system. As we’ll see, well-meaning and popular solutions—often in­
volving new drugs, devices, or even quality improvement efforts—may 
aggravate rather than solve the problems.
That’s why so many people have a huge stake in understanding the 
back business. The first group of stakeholders is obviously back pain 
sufferers. If you have back pain, this book will help you take more con­
trol of the problem, avoid harm, and get your life back—or keep it.
Hope is an important part of getting better, and I want to convince 
you that even if  there’s not a definitive cure, your life is going to im­
prove. Although you’ll read here about many ineffective treatments,
3
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there are treatments that can help, and most require patients to take 
charge of their care.
So one goal of this book is to encourage more involvement in deci­
sions about your own care. This doesn’t mean insisting on a particular 
test or treatment against medical advice. It doesn’t mean that medi­
cal advice is always wrong or that you can’t trust your doctor. Rather, 
it means you need to become well informed and deeply involved in 
making decisions about your care. Blindly accepting professional 
recommendations—even though they’re well meaning—may not al­
ways be a successful strategy.
David Freedman, a science and business journalist, wrote a book 
ominously titled Wrong. With many medical and business examples, 
he points out that a large fraction of expert advice is flawed. Regarding 
medical controversies, he remarks that humans “happen to be complex 
creatures living in a complex world, so why would we expect answers to 
any interesting question to be simple?”
He goes on to remind us that, given these complexities, any advice 
that’s likely to be right is likely to be complex. It “will come with many 
qualifications.. . .  Because of all the ifs, ands, or buts, it will be difficult 
to act on.”
Even more frustrating, Freedman argues that we’re all attracted to 
simple solutions and overly optimistic predictions. So genuinely good 
advice is often incompatible with our expectations. It’s likely to be at 
odds with every aspect of the advice we want to believe.
What about the latest and greatest cures for back pain reported in 
the media? These cures appear on an almost daily basis. Freedman sug­
gests being wary of advice that gets favorable attention from the press, 
the online crowd, or your friends. The problem is that the popularity of 
an idea is likely to reflect good promotion, provocativeness, or how well 
it resonates with the conventional wisdom rather than its likelihood of 
being right. We should beware of false messiahs.
I encourage avoiding a passive role not only in decision making but 
in physical activity. Don’t treat back pain by going to bed rest, the 
standard treatment prescription when I was in medical training. Don’t
4
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assume the cure will be found by lying in an MRI scanner. Don’t as­
sume it will be fixed by lying on an operating table. Don’t assume that 
lying down for injections will be the cure. We’ll see the fallacies in each 
of these assumptions.
In fact, resuming activities, increasing physical activity, and even 
vigorous exercise are often the keys to improving back pain—things no 
doctor or practitioner can do for you.
This leads to the second group of readers I hope to reach: the health 
care professionals who treat back pain. Although some may seem moti­
vated by self-interest as much as by patient need, most are deeply caring 
and want to help.
That’s one reason they continue to “do something,” even when that 
something may not work. Doctors, physical therapists, and nurse prac­
titioners, like so many Americans, have been socialized not to “just sit 
there” but to act.
The imperative to act is especially hard to resist when a suffering 
human being is sitting in your office begging for relief. Unfortunately, 
as we’ll see, many of the things doctors recommend may be useless or 
worse. So providing those who treat back pain with a better under­
standing of the research evidence may help them do a better job with 
their patients.
Finally, I hope to reach policy makers and the media. The media 
have become an integral part of the medical industrial complex in gen­
eral and the back business in particular. Miracle cures are a staple of 
popular health coverage. They attract an eager readership at magazine 
stands and bookstores and in cyberspace or the blogosphere.
There’s nothing particularly sexy about exercise and yoga classes— 
activities that may be genuinely helpful for back pain. But the constant 
stream of “miracle cure” stories attracts hits. The problem is that it 
conveys a message to back pain sufferers that salvation lies in expensive 
treatments. Typically, treatments that are done to them rather than ac­
tivities done by them.
If we want to deal effectively with back pain—not to mention 
our broader health care crisis—it’s important that journalists, health
5
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reporters, and bloggers become more critical. They need to understand 
how to frame the issues, critically analyze the latest treatments, and 
translate this to a lay audience of patients and their families.
Policy makers also need to learn more about the genesis of the prob­
lems they’re trying to solve. Back pain is a perfect policy laboratory. 
Our research into relationships between patients and doctors teaches 
us that putative silver bullets sometimes only make the problem worse. 
These silver bullets often include ever more intensive intervention, new 
technology, pain scales, and patient satisfaction questionnaires.
As we take a tour of the back business, many readers—particularly 
patients and doctors—may be deeply suspicious of my conclusions. Ar­
guments to decrease use of specific medical services are often received 
with skepticism because this appears only to reduce quality of care and 
not improve it. Such a message will alarm readers who are convinced 
that certain treatments will work. As we’ll see, even highly educated 
and influential people often insist on tests and treatments for back pain 
that are unlikely to help.
Other readers will question the motives of anyone who argues for 
less medical intervention, assuming that this reflects insensitivity to 
suffering, preoccupation with cost cutting, efforts to ration care, or a 
threat to patient autonomy. On the surface, cost containment seems to 
be the sole motivation. Insurance company maneuvers to limit their 
costs only reinforce these suspicions.
Glib pronouncements that “less is more” or that we’re practicing 
“evidence-based medicine” are not reassuring. These phrases lead many 
people to conclude that something is being withheld—something that 
might have benefit. How could more testing and more information 
possibly be harmful? How could treatment that’s more intensive possi­
bly lead to worse results?
Answering these questions is part of the challenge of this book. A 
recurring theme is not to confuse doing more with doing what’s best.
Have rapidly rising expenditures for back pain and a raft of new 
treatments helped? If more care and newer care were better, we might 
expect falling rates of activity limitation and work disability due to
6
B A C K  P A IN  N A T IO N
back pain. If all the surgical innovations of recent years were real im­
provements, we might see rates of repeat surgery going down. That is, 
we might expect that people would be doing so well after surgery, they 
wouldn’t need more operations.
With heart disease, that seems to be just what’s happening. Work 
disability from heart and blood vessel disease has been falling in recent 
decades. This is a result of better prevention and better treatment.
But for back pain, just the opposite is occurring. Annual surveys of 
people with back pain report steadily worse functional limitations over 
the past decade. Work disability due to back pain has been increasing. 
And rates of repeat surgery have been going up instead of down. This is 
both counterintuitive and emotionally unsatisfying.
But with back pain—as with many chronic diseases—there’s a fun­
damental flaw in assuming that someone else is going to fix you. None­
theless, they can get rich trying.
Let’s be honest about a couple of things. First, research shows that 
most people with a recent onset of back pain— even severe back pain— 
will get better on their own, through natural healing processes. As a re­
sult, it’s surprisingly hard to prove that treatments help in a new episode 
of back pain. That’s because any treatment comparison has to beat this 
normal, rapid healing. Furthermore, because most people get better, it’s 
easy to make the mistake of assuming that the improvement was the 
result of a particular treatment.
A fraction of people with back pain develop ongoing, unrelenting 
problems. Even more develop grumbling, low-level pain that flares up 
from time to time. For people with persistent or “chronic” pain, there 
are no magic bullets. I don’t have a cure. To paraphrase a Frank Cotham 
cartoon in the New Yorker, I don’t even have a race for the cure.
Most books and magazine articles on back pain offer The Cure. But 
notice . . .  the cures are all different. And disabling back pain is increas­
ing in the United States, despite the proliferation of cures.
The overabundance of cures, and variations in clinical practice 
from one doctor to the next, prompted my longtime colleague Dan 
Cherkin to subtitle an article we once wrote, “Who You See Is What
7
C H A P T E R  1
You Get.” A New York pain specialist, Dr. Seth Waldman, put it slightly 
differently. “Each approach to diagnosis and treatment is essentially a 
franchise, and there are too many franchises battling for control.”
Dr. Scott Haldeman is a medical neurologist and  a chiropractor. 
As if that’s not enough, he has a PhD in neurophysiology. His roots in 
South Africa are still audible when he speaks, and his education spans 
South Africa, Canada, and the United States. In a recent review, he 
and his colleagues counted more than two hundred available treatment 
options for chronic low back pain, without even considering surgery.
Now, if you have pernicious anemia, there’s one treatment: vita­
min B12. If you have thyroid deficiency, there’s one treatment: thyroid 
hormone replacement. If you have appendicitis, there’s generally one 
treatment: an appendectomy. But for back pain, there are more than 
two hundred options, plus dozens of different surgical procedures. If 
one treatment were overwhelmingly effective or clearly superior, this 
situation wouldn’t exist.
Throughout this book, I’ll be talking about lower back pain, which 
is more frequent than neck pain. And I’ll be talking about the most 
common type of back pain—the type that’s not caused by cancer, in­
fection, or serious underlying disease. The type that’s not associated 
with serious nerve injury that might cause foot or leg weakness, for 
example.
You may assume that you need an MRI to rule out these more se­
rious conditions, but a careful office examination is usually all that’s 
necessary. In fact, we’ll look at some hazards of getting fancy tests when 
they aren’t needed.
Overtesting and overtreatment turn out to be rampant in the back 
pain world. This partly explains why costs are skyrocketing while re­
sults are plunging. Again, this is hard to understand.
Hasn’t medical research improved length and quality of life for peo­
ple with AIDS? Isn’t it true that kidney transplants do the same for peo­
ple with end-stage kidney failure? Don’t people with hip replacements 
get to play tennis again? W hy aren’t the results of care for back pain 
similarly improving?
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Peter Pronovost is an intensive care doctor at Johns Hopkins Med­
ical School in Baltimore. Clean-shaven and with a full head of light 
brown hair, he looks like a handsome athlete. He’s famous for reducing 
complications in intensive care units by simply using checklists, as pi­
lots do before flying, to avoid overlooking simple steps.
Pronovost argues that we have two American health care systems: 
“one that leads the world in discoveries and the other that often harms 
rather than heals.” He also reminds us of consistent best estimates that 
the U.S. health care system wastes one-third of all spending—about 
$900 billion a year— on errors, waste, and inefficient care.
I argue that care for back pain is part of Pronovost’s second health 
care system. Care for back pain is low-hanging fruit, where we could 
easily improve care and cut costs at the same time. In fact, it’s the poster 
child for medical waste. Much of this is the result of an entire industry 
built around pain, taking advantage of vulnerable people who are often 
desperate for explanations and relief.
So over the next chapters we’ll look closely at research on the ef­
ficacy of most popular back pain treatments. We’ll examine what we 
know about them and then, at the end of the book, turn to what really 
works. In the course of this exploration, we’ll learn why people may 
be “helped” by ineffective treatments, why doctors continue to pre­
scribe them, and what we can do to break this cycle. I’ll conclude with 
recommendations designed to promote better treatment, less pain and 
suffering, and lower health care costs.
I’ve had the opportunity to treat many patients with back pain and 
to conduct some key back pain research. Our studies have challenged 
and changed the standard of back care in the United States and around 
the world. Most of these studies have passed the test of time and helped 
patients and health care providers alike.
Yet even the best scientific studies draw opposition by threatening 
the status quo and the lucrative back pain industry. As a medical ed­
itor reminds us, once an industry builds up around an idea, research 
evidence gets politicized. Good research may get lost in a blizzard of 
opinion pieces.
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So I’ve taken my share of flak at major spine conferences. This can 
happen when you challenge outmoded thinking and dare to suggest 
that some popular treatments aren’t safe and effective. I quickly learned 
that dealing with disagreement and controversy is part and parcel of 
being a scientist. Let me offer some stories of my baptism in the back 
pain business and how I came to be convinced that some treatments 
are overused.
Going to Bed for Back Pain
When I started my medical career in the 1980s, the standard treatment 
for back pain was bed rest. Strict bed rest. You were not to get out of bed 
for meals. You were not to sit up in bed. We debated whether it was okay 
to go to the bathroom or whether a bedside commode was necessary. 
No one questioned the value of bed rest. We argued instead whether 
it had to be for two weeks or whether one week could suffice. But we 
prescribed some kind of bed rest for everyone with back pain.
Have you ever tried staying in bed for two weeks without sitting 
up? It’s hard even to imagine. Even watching TV would require having 
it bolted to the ceiling. It was a prescription destined to drive people 
mad. And two weeks of bed rest is enough to cause muscle weakness 
and deconditioning of the heart and lungs. Fortunately, I doubt that 
anyone actually followed our instructions, and many admitted that 
they didn’t.
We’d see those patients back in the office a few weeks later for 
follow-up. I’d often ask if they’d finished the bed rest as prescribed. The 
usual response was a chagrined, “Well, I tried it for a couple of days but 
really couldn’t do it any longer than that.” Or, “Well, I couldn’t afford 
to miss work that long, so I had to cut it short.”
“Well, is your back feeling better?” I’d ask. “Oh yeah, it’s quite a bit 
better now” was the usual response.
Here was an odd disconnect. Most patients weren’t following our 
instructions at all, but most were getting better anyway. What if  the 
conventional wisdom was just wrong?
10
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When I looked for scientific studies on the effectiveness of bed rest, 
I couldn’t find any. This seemed to be a treatment based on theory, lore, 
and authoritarian pronouncement rather than actual data.
The theory was that lying down minimized pressure in the discs of 
the spine, the cushions between the vertebrae. And there was research 
using large-bore needles positioned in the disc and attached to pressure 
transducers showing that was true. But no one had proven that disc 
pressure was a key source of pain or that bed rest made pain get better 
faster.
The decision seemed to matter. Even though bed rest wasn’t a treat­
ment we billed for, the stakes for a patient were high. A week or two of 
work absenteeism had financial risks, and for some might even jeopar­
dize the job. Physical deconditioning was inevitable. Being immobile 
thins bones, weakens muscles, and increases the risk of blood clots in 
the legs.
So in the 1980s, having just finished a research fellowship, I wanted 
to test whether bed rest actually made any difference. In the face of 
some skepticism and anxiety, my colleagues and I designed a study to 
test the theory.
We would take patients from a walk-in clinic with a complaint of 
back pain and—with their consent—randomly assign them to a full 
week of bed rest or just two days. We had to persuade the human re­
search ethics committee that it was reasonable to withhold a full week 
of bed rest. That was the standard of care, after all. We chose two days 
of bed rest as a comparison strategy because it just seemed too radical 
to recommend none at all.
We recruited more than two hundred patients, most with back pain 
for less than a month. Then we followed them up over three months. 
We found no difference at all between the two-day strategy and the 
seven-day strategy in terms of pain relief or return to normal activities.
The only difference in the results was in work absenteeism. Those 
who spent two days in bed missed an average of three days of work, com­
pared with six days for those assigned to a week in bed. In essence, by 
prescribing bed rest, we were prescribing work absenteeism without any
11
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medical benefit. Some people might not be able to return to physically 
demanding jobs after just two days, but they didn’t need to stay in bed.
Since that time, nine more randomized trials have come to essen­
tially the same conclusion. And of course, several of those studies tested 
a strategy of no bed rest at all. The results of these studies hint that 
staying out of bed isn’t merely as good but might be better than resting 
in bed. And the lack of benefit for bed rest seems to be true for people 
with sciatica as well as back pain alone. That’s the electric shock-like 
pain in the leg that some people with back pain get.
Happily, doctors no longer prescribe bed rest for back pain.
A few years after our study, one of my colleagues, a neurologist with a 
wry sense of humor, kidded me about the consequences. Tongue firmly in 
cheek, he reminded me that our research had eliminated one of doctors’ 
favorite excuses. “If someone with back pain didn’t get better,” he said, 
“we could always ask, ‘Well, did you stay at strict bed rest for a week?’ ” 
When the answer was inevitably “no,” we could always say, “Well, no 
wonder you didn’t get better! You didn’t follow my instructions!”
Of course, he was describing a classic strategy of blaming the vic­
tim. We had a good laugh and were both pleased that clinical practice 
was evolving away from this approach.
When the New England Journa l o f  M edicine published our bed rest 
study, it got some attention in the news media because back pain is so 
common. I got a few angry letters from patients who felt I was taking 
a valuable treatment away from them. One wished me a lifetime of 
agonizing chronic back pain as retribution. I also got a few indignant 
letters from neurosurgeons, who just knew bed rest was critical and that 
patients would be harmed without it.
But overall, doctors accepted the study, and there was only mod­
est controversy. I got invitations to lecture about the results, and they 
seemed to fit well with a growing sense that bed rest wasn’t much use 
for this condition, or for anything else. No one was making money off 
bed rest, there was no market for bed rest, there was no industry sup­
ported by bed rest. It was an easy sell. Practice changed.
Contrast that with the impact of our next major research effort.
12
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Less than Electrifying Results
Our next project was a study of transcutaneous electrical nerve stimula­
tion, or TENS. TENS is a treatment that delivers mild electrical stim­
ulation through several electrodes stuck to the skin. The stimulation 
comes from a device about the size of a deck of cards, which attaches 
easily to a belt and has wires to the electrodes.
Doctors also based this treatment on a theory—that sensation from 
an outside source could compete with pain signals to the brain, reduc­
ing the pain sensation. There was an analogy to rubbing your funny 
bone when you smack your elbow.
Companies initially developed TENS units as a way to screen for 
patients who might benefit from surgically implanted electrodes right 
next to the spinal cord. When some patients seemed to improve with a 
TENS unit alone, it became a treatment in its own right. But there was 
little rigorous proof that it worked.
So—again with patient consent—we assigned patients with per­
sistent back pain to get a real TENS unit or a sham TENS unit. The 
sham units were identical to the real thing, with a flashing “on” light, 
but they delivered no electrical current.
Patients in both the true TENS and the sham TENS groups im­
proved. In fact, both groups improved the same amount, at the same 
pace. The benefit of TENS appeared to be mostly a placebo effect.
The New EnglandJournal o f  M edicine also published this study, and 
it got a lot of attention. This time, the response was more heated.
I found myself debating with the president of a TENS manufacturer 
on public radio. The company president argued that without the wonders 
of TENS, patients would be “condemned to the living hell of narcotic 
addiction,” as if TENS or narcotics were the only treatment choices for 
back pain. Remember, Scott Haldeman identified two hundred different 
treatments for back pain described in the medical literature.
I found myself responding to angry letters from physical therapists, 
who often recommend and manage TENS therapy. Letters to the editors 
of clinical journals and newsletters attacked our study for years—and
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still do even today. It apparently hit a nerve that our study of bed rest 
didn’t.
Sales of TENS units dipped for a while but then recovered. None­
theless, a recent review of research studies (almost twenty years later) 
supported our results. It concluded that the highest-quality trials do 
“not support the use of TENS in the routine management of chronic 
low back pain.” It also encouraged further research, because there are 
still few high-quality studies. Guidelines from the American Academy 
of Neurology similarly concluded, “TENS is not recommended for the 
treatment of chronic low back pain.”
In 2012 the controversy led Medicare to encourage research that’s 
more definitive. Medicare officials have taken the stance that they’ll 
pay for TENS therapy only if  patients agree to participate in such a 
study. The results may determine whether Medicare will continue in­
surance coverage for TENS.
This was my introduction to the influence of entrenched interests 
in managing back pain. The device manufacturers and therapists who 
favored TENS therapy had a major investment in the treatment. They 
vigorously resisted any suggestion that it might be no more than a 
placebo.
Unfortunately, their response was not to fund more and better 
research. Once a treatment has approval of the Food and Drug Ad­
ministration (FDA), manufacturers have little to gain by doing more 
research.
You may assume that FDA approval of TENS units means they’ve 
been well tested and proven effective. But TENS units were introduced 
shortly before the FDA acquired authority over medical devices in 
1976. At that time, devices already on the market were “grandfathered 
in” for approval. Furthermore, the FDA’s early evaluation of medical 
devices focused on safety more than efficacy. And newer devices are 
widely approved on the basis of “substantial equivalence” to devices 
marketed before 1976.
I was beginning to learn about the back business. It’s a for-profit busi­
ness dedicated to selling products and generating return for stockholders.
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Any benefit for patients is welcome but secondary. And as we’ll see, the 
market comes close to including every American adult. It’s a business 
that always assumes newer and more is better, despite growing evidence 
to the contrary.
My immersion in the back Business had begun, but it was far from 
complete.
Fusing Spines
My real baptism came with research on spinal fusion surgery. This is 
an operation designed to join two vertebrae with bone grafts, an oper­
ation we’ll discuss later in more detail. It’s most often performed today 
with screws inserted into the vertebrae, and connecting rods or plates 
to immobilize the vertebrae while the bone grafts heal. This hardware 
is expensive and profitable, adding thousands of dollars to the cost of 
a single back operation. The most popular gadgets are called pedicle 
screws, which were relatively new at the time we naively embarked on a 
new research project.
As the TENS project was being published, our research team re­
ceived funding from the federal Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research. Congress gave this new agency responsibility for improving 
the effectiveness and efficiency of health care rather than making lab­
oratory discoveries.
One part of our research focused on spinal fusion surgery. Our crit­
ical review of the available research suggested that there were few sci­
entifically validated indications for this type of surgery. Our research 
also suggested that this type of surgery resulted in greater costs and 
complications than simpler forms of back surgery.
At the same time, the agency sponsored a guideline panel to sum­
marize the research literature on back pain, and I was a member of the 
panel. The chair was an orthopedic surgeon, and the panel included 
three other orthopedic and neurosurgeons. The entire panel had twenty- 
three members, representing nearly every profession and specialty with 
an interest in back pain. The panel limited itself to back pain of recent
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onset, or “acute” low back pain, and concluded that nonsurgical treat­
ments were most often appropriate. Regarding fusion surgery, all the 
studies we found addressed persistent back pain, so there was no evi­
dence that it helped for acute pain.
The research and guideline efforts were simply too much for the 
North American Spine Society, a group made up mainly of spine sur­
geons. The society had close ties to the companies that make screws 
and rods for fusion surgery. The Spine Society argued that our research 
and the guidelines were biased against their preferred forms of therapy. 
The group inspired a letter-writing campaign to Congress, and some 
members formed a lobbying group with the stated goal of eliminating 
the funding agency.
One screw manufacturer, AcroMed, sought a subpoena of all our 
research records and communications at the University of Washington. 
Another company, Sofamor Danek, sought a court injunction to block 
release of the back pain guidelines. Neither effort was successful, but 
they exposed the role of device manufacturers in opposing our research 
and the production of guidelines.
The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research became a polit­
ical target not only because of lobbying related to back pain but also 
because a new Congress was eager to cut government spending as part 
of its “Contract with America.” Further, Republican members of Con­
gress saw the agency and its new head as advocates for the Clinton 
health plan, which they opposed.
In one budget draft, the House of Representatives eliminated the 
agency. However, many medical groups and hospital organizations 
came to the support of the agency, and it survived with endorsement of 
the Senate—but with a 25 percent budget cut. Political pressure related 
to the back pain guidelines led the agency to stop sponsoring the pro­
duction of guidelines, despite a congressional mandate when the agency 
was established. And despite the fact that guidelines could be useful to 
thousands or even millions of patients and their doctors.
The North American Spine Society later faced allegations that some 
of its continuing medical education programs were thinly disguised
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promotions for the spinal screws. The plaintiffs, patients alleging bad 
results from pedicle screws, likened the educational seminars to Tup- 
perware parties.
Courts dismissed suits against the Spine Society for lack of evi­
dence, but suits against the device manufacturers went forward. Ac- 
roMed, which had subpoenaed our research records, settled thousands 
of patient lawsuits alleging bad results, for $100 million. The company 
did not acknowledge any liability.
Years later, in 2006, Sofamor Danek’s parent company, Medtronic, 
reached a $40 million settlement with the federal government over 
allegations of kickbacks to spine surgeons. The company denied any 
wrongdoing, but the Justice Department described the kickbacks as 
“sham consulting agreements, sham royalty agreements and lavish 
trips.”
Also in 2006, the successor to the Agency for Health Care Pol­
icy and Research (the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
or AHRQ) sponsored a systematic review of the research literature on 
use of spine fusion surgery for a common diagnosis, degeneration of 
spinal discs. By that time, there were some strong research studies, all 
from Europe, that we hadn’t had in the mid-1990s. That draft review 
concluded, “Fusion for degenerative disc disease has no conclusive 
advantage over nonsurgical treatment, either in the short-term or the 
long-term.”
Despite research findings and allegations against the manufactur­
ers, sales of pedicle screws and similar spinal devices have risen steadily 
since our research in the 1990s, thanks in part to aggressive marketing. 
According to government statistics, spinal fusion surgery of all sorts 
increased 660 percent between 1993 and 2010. The proportion of op­
erations involving pedicle screws or similar hardware has increased as 
well, so that surgeons now use these devices in the vast majority of 
fusion operations.
Even some surgeons find the increase alarming. Dr. Edward Ben- 
zel, a neurosurgeon at the prestigious Cleveland Clinic, estimated that 
fewer than half the spinal fusions being performed were appropriate.
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“The reality of it is, we all cave in to market and economic forces,” he 
told the New York Times in 2003. In the same article, Yale University 
neurosurgeon Zoher Ghogawala added, “I see too many patients who 
are recommended a fusion that absolutely do not need it.”
The Times also quoted Stan Mendenhall, the editor and publisher 
of Orthopedic Network News. Mendenhall said, “A lot of technological 
innovation serves shareholders more than patients. . . . The money is 
driving a lot of this.” And spine fusion rates have continued to climb 
steeply since those comments a decade ago.
We might note that none of these investigations has prompted Con­
gress to substantially expand AHRQ’s budget or restore its mandate to 
sponsor development of clinical guidelines.
In retrospect, each of our research projects inflamed opponents who 
had strong beliefs or market share in a particular approach to back 
pain. None welcomed evidence that conflicted with strongly held opin­
ions. And some were big businesses that seemed eager to avoid scrutiny 
of their products while profiting from patients with back pain. These 
experiences became the germ of my conviction that were overusing 
many treatments for back pain.
What’s the real evidence that some treatments for back pain are 
overused? Does research support this conclusion? This book addresses 
these questions and many more. It’s the first comprehensive look into 
what has become a vast and lucrative industry purporting to address 
back pain, a problem that afflicts millions of Americans.
As we look for more evidence of overuse, I’ll introduce a number of 
back pain sufferers, some of them quite famous. You may figure that 
you’re smart enough to avoid the pitfalls. But even the best and bright­
est among us have sometimes stumbled when it comes to getting treated 
for back pain. We’ll take a look at some of these individuals over the 
course of this book and see what we can learn from their experiences.
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Chapter 2
EVEN THE BEST 
AND BRIGHTEST
We know a lot about managing back pain, but many patients never get adequate care. Even celebrities and those in prominent posi­tions sometimes encounter quicksand when they seek care for back pain.
David Fridovich is a tough guy. He was a star linebacker in college, 
then a Green Beret. In fact, he became a three-star general and dep­
uty commander of the nation’s elite Special Forces—the Green Berets, 
Army Rangers, Navy SEALS, and Delta Force.
Cindy McCain is a savvy businesswoman and philanthropist. She 
chaired one of the largest beer distributors in the United States, became 
the wife of Senator John McCain, and adopted an orphan from Bangla­
desh. She took up racecar driving and flying in her spare time.
Jerome Groopman is a famous doctor and author. He’s a professor 
of medicine at Harvard Medical School and a leading researcher in can­
cer and AIDS. In all his spare time, he pens articles for the New Yorker 
and writes best-selling books.
John F. Kennedy was the king of Camelot. He served all too briefly 
as the thirty-fifth president of the United States.
What do these four have in common, other than being smart, am­
bitious, talented, and successful? Like most of us at some time, they
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were plagued by back pain. Unlike many of us, by virtue of position or 
wealth, they had access to the best health care in the world. And yet, to 
make matters worse, all suffered at the hands of medical professionals 
they consulted.
Consider the experience of President Kennedy. What he thought 
was the best medical care in the world bought him two failed back 
operations, life-threatening complications, a raft of fruitless injections, 
a useless corset, and years of unnecessary pain. He improved only after 
pursuing a rigorous exercise program created by Dr. Hans Kraus, a 
pioneer of sports medicine.
Like Kennedy, the others found benefits from proven low-tech 
treatments after suffering through unproven high-tech treatments. We 
shouldn’t conclude that all novel or high-tech back pain treatments are 
useless—but many are overused.
Kennedy’s instructive medical history illustrates many of the themes 
of this book. So let’s take a closer look at the history of his back pain 
and the mistakes he and his doctors made. Then we’ll consider the les­
sons that modern patients can glean from his experiences. Even though 
his story is decades old, and treatments have ostensibly advanced since 
the 1960s, many modern patients have similar experiences. In fact, you 
may conclude that little has changed.
We now have details of Kennedy’s back problems, thanks to recent 
work by both historians and doctors. The relevant medical records be­
came accessible only in 2002 because they had been guarded by friends 
of the Kennedy administration. Most recently, the family of Dr. Hans 
Kraus donated some of Kennedy’s private medical records to the Ken­
nedy Presidential Library in 2006, filling in events from Kennedy’s final 
years. I had a chance to review Kraus’s records at the Kennedy Library.
A Presidential Problem
According to military records, Kennedy began having “an occasional 
pain in his right sacro-iliac joint” as early as age twenty-one. Kennedy 
himself described sudden back pain after a tennis match during college,
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reporting that it felt like “something had slipped.” His mother, Rose 
Kennedy, cited a football injury as yet another possible cause of Kenne­
dy’s back pain.
With the outbreak of World War II, Kennedy tried to volunteer for 
both the Army and the Navy, but both rejected him because of back 
problems. At that point, Kennedy undertook a personal exercise pro­
gram. A subsequent medical examination in 1941 deemed him fit for 
duty, though Kennedy sought further evaluation of his back problems 
shortly thereafter.
A Boston doctor judged that Kennedy did not have a herniated disc, 
often called a “slipped disc.” The doctor wrote, “I don’t think this is 
a disc since the pain . . . does not even remotely resemble a disc—no 
interference with reflexes, nothing pointing to a spinal condition.”
A Navy neurosurgeon agreed that Kennedy’s pain wasn’t consistent 
with sciatica. Sciatica is the electric shock of pain and tingling that 
travel down the leg when a herniated disc pinches a spinal nerve. His 
doctors recommended against surgery.
Kennedy was working in the Secretary of the Navy’s office when the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, but he wanted a combat assignment. 
After training, he took command of a patrol torpedo (PT) boat in the 
Pacific.
Kennedy’s crew members were aware of his ongoing back prob­
lems. He slept with a plywood board under his mattress and wore a 
“corset-type thing.” A colleague wrote that Kennedy refused to report 
to sick bay and “feigned being w e ll”
During a nighttime patrol in the Solomon Islands, in pitch-black 
conditions, a Japanese destroyer rammed Kennedy’s PT 109. Kennedy 
was at the wheel, but the impact threw him against the rear wall of 
the boat’s cockpit, where his back slammed against a steel reinforcing 
brace.
M ilitary records documented Kennedy’s subsequent heroics. Despite 
his reinjured back, Kennedy towed a badly burned crewman three miles 
through open ocean with a life-jacket strap clenched in his teeth. This 
and other actions won Kennedy the Navy and Marine Corps Medal.
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But the war took a toll on Kennedy’s back problems, which wors­
ened after the sinking of PT 109. It remains unclear if  this was a result 
of the collision, the strenuous rescue effort, or simply the worsening of 
an ongoing condition.
After Kennedy returned to the United States, doctors reevaluated 
him for back surgery. Though still in the Navy, in 1944 Kennedy went 
to the New England Baptist Hospital with his family’s financial sup­
port. Here neurosurgeon James Poppen operated on Kennedy for a 
presumed herniated disc. Following surgery, though, Poppen wrote, 
“There, however, was very little protrusion of the ruptured cartilage.”
Ordinarily, successful disc surgery results in prompt relief. Instead, 
Kennedy had persistent pain, a prolonged hospitalization, and a result­
ing transfer to the Chelsea Naval Hospital. Poppen attributed the on­
going pain to severe muscle spasms.
At the naval hospital, the neurosurgeon who had seen Kennedy be­
fore deployment to the Solomon Islands reassessed the situation. He 
questioned the need for surgery. W hile in the hospital, Kennedy wrote 
to a girlfriend, saying, “In regard to the fascinating subject of my op­
eration I . . . think the doc should have read just one more book before 
picking up the saw.”
After reviewing the records, my orthopedist colleague Robert Hart 
said of the surgery, “It was probably a misdiagnosis, but the surgeon in 
that case did what any surgeon would do—he went ahead and removed 
the disk anyway.” Hart also noted that X-rays a few months after sur­
gery were normal, with no signs of wear in the discs or vertebrae and 
nothing that would make the spine unstable.
Kennedy was from a political family, so it was no surprise that af­
ter his Navy discharge, he ran for Congress. He had persistent back 
problems through a vigorous political campaign. Those close to him 
described frequent use of steaming hot tub baths and a lumbar corset. 
The campaign was successful despite the back problems. Kennedy won 
by a wide margin and served in Congress for six years.
In 1952, Kennedy moved into the Senate after defeating incum­
bent Republican Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. While campaigning, he often
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walked with crutches to relieve his spine. During his first Senate term, 
Kennedy’s back pain progressed, and he became unbearable to work 
with. His personal secretary of twelve years, Evelyn Lincoln, wrote that 
she considered finding a new job.
By 1954, X-rays showed that the disc space where Kennedy had 
surgery had completely collapsed, leaving essentially no cushion be­
tween the adjacent vertebrae. Some early bone spurs were beginning to 
form. My colleague, Bob Hart, reviewed the X-rays and found no sign 
of osteoporosis or vertebral compression fractures, contradicting some 
historians.
That year, at age thirty-seven, Kennedy discussed further back sur­
gery at New York’s Hospital for Special Surgery. Despite increased risks 
due to other medical problems, Kennedy and his doctors decided to pro­
ceed with a spinal fusion operation at the site of the previous disc sur­
gery. Doctors told Kennedy that a fusion procedure would strengthen 
his lower spine and that without it he might lose his ability to walk.
His father, Joe Kennedy, tried to dissuade Kennedy from surgery. 
But Rose Kennedy later said, “Jack was determined to have the opera­
tion. He told his father that even if  the risks were fifty-fifty, he would 
rather be dead than spend the rest of his life hobbling on crutches and 
paralyzed by pain.”
Kennedy underwent the spinal fusion procedure, an operation that 
welds vertebrae together with bone grafts. The operation included place­
ment of a metal implant made of cobalt-chromium. Such implanted 
plates were relatively new: a high-tech aspect of Kennedy’s treatment.
The postoperative course went poorly. Perhaps because of a serious 
urinary infection, Kennedy at one point lapsed into unconsciousness, 
and a priest performed last rites. When he finally left the hospital, Ken­
nedy went to recover at a family home in Palm Beach, Florida.
But an infection brewed at the site of his surgery. In 1955, he re­
turned to the hospital for his third spine operation: to remove the metal 
plates and surgically clean the infected wound.
While recovering from this operation, Kennedy consulted with 
Dr. Janet Travell. Travell, a specialist in internal medicine and pain
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medicine, eventually became his personal doctor. Asked about the 
cause of Kennedy’s back pain, Travell found it impossible “to recon­
struct by hindsight what might have happened to him over the years.” 
However, in her opinion, Kennedy “resented” the back operations, 
which “seemed to only make him worse.”
Travell later recommended a rocking chair for Kennedy, believing it 
helped his back. She also began trigger point injections with procaine, 
a local anesthetic. Kennedy’s diagnosis when he left the hospital was 
sacroiliac and lumbar pain with continued muscle spasm.
In 1957, Dr. Travell diagnosed a recurrent abscess of the lumbar 
spine and admitted Kennedy once again to the Hospital for Special 
Surgery. In Kennedy’s fourth spine operation, surgeons drained a staph 
abscess and removed dead tissue.
In 1960, Kennedy mounted his successful campaign for the presi­
dency. At that point, he was determined to present the picture of health 
and vigor, declaring himself in “excellent” shape. But in the White 
House, Kennedy received regular medical care from a phalanx of doc­
tors, among them Travell, Admiral George Burkley, and a doctor who 
had immigrated from Germany, Max Jacobson. Jacobson had the rep­
utation for treating celebrities with “pep pills” (amphetamines), and 
patients nicknamed him “Dr. Feelgood.”
Jacobson treated Kennedy with injections of a bizarre cocktail of 
vitamins, hormones, amphetamines, and other ingredients. Kennedy 
thought these made him less dependent on crutches and once dismissed 
questions about the injections by saying, “I don’t care if  it’s horse piss. 
It works.”
However, Burkley concluded in 1961 that Kennedy’s various pas­
sive treatments, including injections, back braces, ultrasound, and hot 
packs, were doing more harm than good. He observed what Kennedy 
tried to hide from the press: that the president went up and down he­
licopter stairs one at a time, rose only with difficulty from sitting, and 
often relied on crutches. Fearing the president might end up in a wheel­
chair, he pressed Travell to consult Dr. Hans Kraus.
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Kraus was an Austrian immigrant who specialized in rehabilitation 
medicine. He was an exercise advocate and had worked with President 
Eisenhower to establish the President’s Council on Physical Fitness. A 
mountaineer and rock climber who married a downhill ski champion, 
Kraus was well known to athletes. Some describe him as the father of 
sports medicine in the United States.
A biographer noted, “Dr. Kraus’s approach was controversial within 
the American medical establishment. He relied strongly on strengthen­
ing and stretching exercises, common sense, and avoiding surgery at all 
costs. His treatments were seemingly old-fashioned, time-consuming 
and relatively unprofitable for a doctor.” Nonetheless, he had a celeb­
rity clientele that included Katharine Hepburn, Eleanor Roosevelt, Yul 
Brynner, and Angela Lansbury.
Records in the Kennedy Library show that Kraus examined JFK in 
October 1961 and concluded, “Weakness and stiffness of key posture 
muscles may well account for some of the persistent pain and acute epi­
sodes. . . . We should try a program of gradually increasing strengthen­
ing exercises for weak muscles, and limbering and stretching exercises 
for stiff muscles.. . .  I would be in favor of injecting as little as possible.”
Kennedy began to exercise three times a week in a small White 
House gym. He followed a regimen of aerobics, strengthening, and 
flexibility exercises, all to the strains of his favorite country-and-western 
and show tunes.
Along with massage and heat therapy, this regimen became a re­
spite for Kennedy from his busy schedule. Nonetheless, Kraus’s notes 
repeatedly indicate that, given competing demands, Kennedy was not 
as adherent to the program as Kraus would have liked.
Even so, the exercise program produced results within weeks. A New 
York Times article in December 1961 noted, “President Kennedy still is 
swimming and taking muscle-strengthening exercises every day. . . . 
His bad back apparently is tremendously better. . . . Dr. Kraus still 
makes the visit once or twice a week, Presidential aides said, and he has 
done wonders for the President.”
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